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Any  theory of  how  nominal money affects the real economy must face up 
to the following conundrum: Demand or supply functions derived-whether 
precisely or heuristically-from  basic micro principles have money, M,  as an 
argument only in ratio to  the general price level. Hence, if monetary policy 
is to have real effects, there must be some reason why changes in M are not 
followed promptly  by  equiproportionate changes in  I.!  This is the  sense in 
which some kind of “price stickiness” is essential to virtually any story of how 
monetary policy works.’ 
Keynes (1936) offered one of the first intellectually coherent (or was it?) 
explanations for price stickiness by positing that money wages are sticky, and 
perhaps even rigid-at  least in the downward direction. In that case, what 
Keynes called “the money supply in wage units,” M/W, moves in the same 
direction as nominal money,  thereby stimulating the economy. In  the basic 
Keynesian model,2  prices are not sticky relative to wages. It is wage rigidity 
that makes P respond less than one-for-one to M. 
In recent years, macroeconomists have focused more on price rigidity than 
on wage rigidity. This shift of  emphasis appears to have two roots. The first 
is the well-known fact that real wages do not display the pronounced counter- 
cyclical pattern that is implied by rigid nominal wages and flexible (and pre- 
sumably procyclical) prices. Hence price rigidity must be part of the story. 
Alan S. Blinder is the Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics at Princeton 
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1. There are some exceptions. For example, changes in the money-growth rate can affect real 
interest rates via their effects on inflationary expectations. However, no one seems to think such 
effects are quantitatively large. And in some models these effects are absent entirely. 
2. By this I mean an IS-LM system with an aggregate supply side consisting of  a standard 
marginal productivity condition for labor demand and a labor supply function with money illusion. 
As a limiting case, the latter could simply be a fixed money wage. 
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The second is the suggestion, made by Barro (1977) and Hall (1980), that 
the observed market wage rate might not be allocative-that  is, it might equal 
neither the marginal product of  labor nor the marginal utility of  leisure. In- 
stead, they suggested, the current real wage might simply be an installment 
payment on a long-term contract. In this view of the labor market, which de- 
rives from Azariadis (1973,  Baily (1974), and Gordon (1974), labor and man- 
agement enter into long-term agreements under which the firm offers stable 
real  wages  but  variable  employment.  In  present-value  (or expected-value) 
terms, the wage matches both the marginal product of labor and the marginal 
utility of leisure. But these equalities need not hold period by period. 
It is unclear how important this view of the labor market is in practice.3 But 
the idea has nonetheless helped shift theorists’ attention from wage rigidity to 
price rigidity. After all, it seems clear that however important long-term im- 
plicit contracts are in the labor market, they must be vastly less important in 
the product market. The research reported on here follows this recent tradition 
by focusing exclusively on theories of sticky prices, not sticky wages4 
There is no shortage of theories of either price or wage rigidity. The supply 
is limited only by the imagination of economic theorists; and since theorists 
can be produced at roughly constant cost, the supply of theories is quite elastic. 
In fact, it appears that new theories are generated far more frequently than old 
ones are rejected. Worse yet, the ebb and flow of competing theories seems to 
have more in common with hemlines than with science-based  more on fad 
and fashion than on fact. Try to think of even a single case in which a theory 
of sticky prices has been rejected econometrically. 
What is the reason for this sorry state of affairs? I believe it is that many, if 
not most, of the theories are epistemologically empty in the following concrete 
sense: (a)  they predict that prices adjust less rapidly than some unmeasured 
Walrasian benchmark, (b)  many of the theories predict nothing other than this, 
and (c)  often the theories rely on variables which are either unmeasurable in 
principle or unmeasured in practice. Under such conditions, it is no wonder 
that conventional econometric methods get us nowhere. 
Is there a better way? The research project reported on here is based on the 
notion that there is. Specifically, almost all of the theories share one aspect in 
common: each traces a chain of  reasoning that allegedly  leads the decision 
maker to conclude that rapid price changes are against the firm’s best interests. 
It struck me that if  a particular price setter actually follows such a chain of 
reasoning, he just might know itP He might not be able to give an intellectually 
coherent explanation of his behavior, just as a pool player cannot explain me- 
chanics. But if the idea is explained to him in plain English, he should recog- 
nize and agree with it. At least that was the belief that motivated this research. 
3. See, for example, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986). 
4. For some related work on theories of sticky wages, see Blinder and Choi (1990). 
5. Pardon the chauvinistic use of the male pronoun throughout, but it turned out that virtually 
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With a team of graduate students, I interviewed two hundred randomly se- 
lected firms about their pricing behavior. The results are now being written up 
in a book, and full details on the survey methodology will be found there. But 
a few points need to be mentioned: 
The sampling frame represented the private, nonfarm, for-profit, unregulated 
gross domestic product (GDP)-about  85 percent of the total. Since sample 
selection probabilities were proportional to value added, further weighting 
of responses is neither necessary nor appropriate. 
At 61 percent, the response rate was gratifyingly  high-which  eases, but 
does not entirely eliminate, womes that the  sample might be unrepresen- 
tative. 
The interviews were  conducted  in  waves between  April  1990 and March 
1992, and most of the interviewers were Princeton graduate students trained 
by me. The interviews were done face-to-face, almost always in the respon- 
dent’s place of business. 
Questions  were  usually  read  verbatim  from the  questionnaire,  but  were 
sometimes paraphrased. Respondents always answered in their own words, 
and interviewers coded the responses on prescribed scales. 
This paper focuses on a small but interesting subset of the results: what we 
learned about the nature and validity of five theories of sticky prices that were 
prominent in the academic discussions of the  1980s. The five theories were 
selected by me on a purely subjective basis.  But my intent was to pick the 
theories that were most discussed, say, at NBER conferences and in graduate 
classrooms during the decade. 
On average, as we shall see, these five theories get lower marks than the 
seven theories that were not “hot” in the 1980s. But the point of this paper is 
not to argue that economic theorists have been barking up the wrong trees, but 
to see what we can learn about the trees up which they have been barking. 
For example, the following question is often thought to be a showstopper in 
discussions of the “menu cost” theory: Aren’t there even bigger fixed costs of 
adjusting quantities? Or another example: How common is judging quality by 
price? Answers to questions like these are available from the survey data-and 
apparently nowhere else. 
The paper is organized into eight sections. Section 4.1 offers evidence that 
prices are indeed sticky. Section 4.2 looks briefly at some of the reasons why, 
including a list of the twelve theories “tested”  by the survey. Then sections 
4.3-4.7  examine in turn the evidence on each of the five recently popular theo- 
ries. Section 4.8 is a brief summary. 
4.1  Evidence That Prices Are Sticky 
I suggested earlier that there is no such thing as definitive evidence that 
prices are “sticky” because (a)  the Walrasian adjustment norm is unmeasured, 
and (b)  the prices that actually clear markets might be long-run contract prices 120  Alan S. Blinder 
Table 4.1  Frequency of Price Adjustment (number of times per year) 
Frequency  Percentage of  Firms 
Less than once 
Once 
1.01 to 2 
2.10 to 4 
4.01 to 12 
12.01 to 52 
52.01 to 365 









and (b)  the prices that actually clear markets might be long-run contract prices 
rather than spot prices. Nonetheless, empirical evidence on the frequency of 
price adjustment makes it hard for many economists-including  me-to  be- 
lieve that the macroeconomy is an auction hall writ large. 
Our survey collected what may be the first evidence on price stickiness ever 
derived from a random sample of the whole economy. To begin with, we asked: 
AIO.h How often do the prices of your most important products change in a 
typical year? 
Of our 200 firms, 186 answered this question, giving a median response of 1.3 
times per year.  As table 4.1 shows, there is a strong mode at  1.0, meaning 
that annual price changes are most typical. Perhaps more pertinent for macro 
models, fully 78 percent of GDP is apparently repriced quarterly or less often. 
That certainly seems like enough price stickiness to matter. 
The most fascinating numbers in the table may be in the tails of the distribu- 
tion, however. About 10 percent of GDP is apparently repriced less frequently 
than once a year; and an equal amount is repriced more than  once a week. 
Indeed, 1.6 percent is repriced more than once a day. Yes, Virginia, there is an 
auction-market sector. But it is pretty small. 
From a theoretical point of view, table 4.1 does not really offer the right 
measure of  price stickiness.  For example, if  cost and demand  shocks occur 
infrequently,  Walrasian prices might change only  once or twice a year. We 
would not want to call that price rigidity. Therefore, another series of questions 
inquired about what seem to me the conceptually correct measures of  price 
stickiness: how much time elapses between a shock to either demand or cost 
and the corresponding price adjustment? 
There were actually four such questions, corresponding to positive and neg- 
ative shocks to both demand and cost. For example: 
A13(a). Firms and industries differ in how rapidly  their prices respond to 
changes in demand and costs. How much time normally elapses after a sig- 
nificant increase in demand before you raise your prices? 
6. Numbers like this throughout the paper correspond to question numbers on the questionnaire. 121  On  Sticky Prices: Academic Theories Meet the Real World 
The other three questions were similar, with “decrease” replacing “increase” 
and/or “cost” replacing “demand.” Respondents were left to decide for them- 
selves the meaning of the adjective “significant.” Table 4.2 summarizes the re- 
sults. 
Much detail lies behind this small table. (The meaning of the last column 
will be explained below). But the main observations seem to be the following: 
1. Lags in price adjustment are long. In round numbers, about three months 
typically elapses between the shock that would change prices in a Walrasian 
world and the firms’ price response. This is good news for simple macro mod- 
els that assume a “one period” lag in adjusting prices. 
2. There is essentially no evidence for the common belief that prices adjust 
more rapidly upward than downward. For demand  shocks, the data suggest 
equal response times. For cost shocks, price increases do appear to come about 
a half-month faster than price decreases-a  difference which is highly sig- 
nificant in a statistical sense but not very large economically. 
3. There is no evidence for the commonly held view that firms respond more 
rapidly to cost shocks than to demand shocks. Rather, the data suggest strik- 
ingly similar response times. 
4. The cross-sectional variances in adjustment lags are huge-larger  than 
the mean itself in all four cases. It would be a mistake, I believe, to interpret 
these large standard deviations as reflecting mostly sampling variance, though 
some is surely present. Rather, these numbers testify to the enormous heteroge- 
neity across firms in the speed of adjusting prices. 
An important technical point about item nonresponse must be made at this 
point. The response rates to the four variants of this question were among the 
lowest in the survey. Thus the bad news is that we got fewer responses to the 
more appropriate (but harder) question  about price stickiness.  About three 
quarters of the nonresponse stems from the fact that the question was inappro- 
priate for some firms. (See the final column in table 4.2) For example, when 
we inquired about delays in cutting prices following a decline in cost, seventy- 
one firms told us that they never experience cost reductions. As you can see in 
the table, many more firms experience positive than negative cost shocks. 
In sum, looking at a random sample of GDP, rather than a selected corner 
of  the economy, reveals a substantial degree of price  stickiness-certainly 
enough to give monetary policy a handle on real activity. But this stickiness 
does not appear to be asymmetric in the two ways commonly assumed by econ- 
Table 4.2  Lags in Price Adjustments (in months) 
Standard  Number of  Number of 
Qpe  of Shock  Mean Lag  Deviation  Responses  “Never Happens” 
Increase in demand  2.88  3.21  128  52 
Increase in cost  2.76  3.00  163  23 
Decrease in demand  2.90  3.70  132  50 
Decrease in cost  3.27  3.92  101  71 122  Alan S. Blinder 
Table 4.3  The Twelve Theories 















Judging quality by price 
Pricing points 
Procyclical elasticity 
Cost-based pricing with lags 
Constant marginal cost 




Delivery lags, service, etc. 
Prices are fixed by contracts 
Firms tacitly agree to stabilize prices, perhaps 
out of “fairness” to customers (Okun 1981) 
Firms fear customers will mistake price cuts for 
reductions in quality (Allen 1988) 
Certain prices (like $9.99) have special 
psychological significance (Kashyap 1992) 
Demand curves become less elastic as they 
shift in (Bils 1989; Shapiro 1988) 
Price rises are delayed until costs rise (Gordon 
1981; Blanchard 1983) 
Marginal cost is flat and markups are constant 
(Hall 1986) 
Firms incur costs of changing prices 
(Rotemberg 1982; Mankiw 1985) 
Bureaucratic delays slow down decisions 
Firms hold back on price changes, waiting for 
Firms vary inventory stocks instead of prices 
Firms prefer to vary other elements of the 
other firms to go first (Ball and Romer 1991) 
(Blinder 1982) 
“vector,” such as delivery lags, service, or 
product quality (Carlton 1990) 
omists. Firms tell us that they do not typically respond faster to demand shocks 
than to cost shocks; nor do they raise prices faster than they lower them. It pays 
to ask!’ 
4.2  Reasons for Price Stickiness 
This survey sought to find out which theories of sticky prices hold most 
appeal for real-world decision makers. Table 4.3 names the twelve theories that 
were evaluated in the survey and offers brief explanations (and citations) for 
each. Asterisks indicate the five that I subjectively selected for attention in 
this paper on the grounds that they received the most academic attention in 
the 1980s. 
Most of  the entries in table 4.3 are self-explanatory, but a few are not. The 
procyclical elasticity theory  represents  a class of  models of  countercyclical 
markups. If new customers are more price-elastic than old ones, then the price 
elasticity of  demand will be procyclical,  making the optimal markup count- 
7. In this case, asking bolsters the answers given by the paltry econometric evidence that exists. 
As early as 1981, Okun (1981, 165) noted that empirical Phillips curves do nor offer evidence 
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ercyclical. No one doubts that prices depend on costs. What makes cost-based 
pricing with  lags a macroeconomic  theory of price stickiness, rather than  a 
tautology, is the recognition that most goods and services pass through several 
stages of  processing (each with  its own lag) on their way  to ultimate users. 
Hierarchical delays is the one theory on the list that did not  come from the 
academic literature; it was suggested, instead, by  a top executive of a large 
manufacturing company during pretesting of the questionnaire. Some (includ- 
ing me) may prefer to think of it as a particular kind of menu cost. 
The popularity poll among the twelve contending theories was run as fol- 
lows. I translated the basic idea of  each theory into plain  English, and then 
asked price setters how important it was in affecting the speed of price adjust- 
ment in  their own company. For example, the question  about nominal con- 
tracting was 
B1.  One  idea  is  that  many  goods  are  sold  under  explicit  contractual 
agreements that set prices in advance, so firms are not free to raise prices 
while contracts remain in force. 
How important is this idea in slowing down price adjustments in your 
company? 
And there was a similar question for each of the twelve theories. Respondents 
answered  in  their own words,  and interviewers coded the responses on the 
following four-point scale: 
1 = totally unimportant 
2 = of minor importance 
3 = moderately important 
4 = very important 
It is straightforward to compare the average ratings given to each of the twelve 
theories, as I shall do shortly. But first a few important caveats. 
First, the reader  should be cautioned  against identifying the above men- 
tioned scale with the standard four-point scale used to grade college students. 
For example, an average grade of 4.0 would not connote anything as mundane 
as a straight-A  average. Rather, it would mean that every single  respondent 
considered the theory “very important,” that is, we had stumbled upon God’s 
truth! Plainly, this is not going to happen. A more plausible standard of excel- 
lence would be an average rating of, say, 3.0. On the low end, an average score 
of  1  .O  would mean that every singZe respondent totally rejected the theory- 
which is more like brain death than a D. So it is perhaps more useful to think 
of the likely range of survey results as going from a top score of 3.0 for a 
wonderful theory to, say, 1.5 for a disastrous one. 
Second, with very few exceptions, the theories are not mutually exclusive. 
Firms can, and often did, agree with several. 
Third, the survey appraises microeconomic importance, not macroeconomic 124  Alan S. Blinder 
Table 4.4  Ratings of the Twelve Theories 
Theory  Mean  Standard  t-  Accept 



















































































2  I .o 
‘Refer to table 4.3 for descriptions of the theories. 
’For the hypothesis that the mean score is significantly above that in the next row. 
‘The question was not asked of firms producing services. Thus 85.6 percent is the percentage of 
these firms that report holding inventories of finished goods. 
*Significant at the 10  percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
importance; and the aggregation process is complex. To illustrate, imagine that 
ten  firms  selling  intermediate  goods followed  the  menu-cost  theory  while 
thirty firms selling final goods simply marked up costs immediately, with no 
lags. Then menu costs would be the macroeconomic source of price stickiness 
even though three-quarters of all firms reject the theory entirely. 
With this understood, I turn to the results of  the beauty  contest. Table 4.4 
ranks the theories by  mean  scores (column  3) and also shows the  standard 
deviation across firms (column 4).*  Asterisks in column 2 once again indicate 
the  five  recently  popular  theories.  The other  columns  require  some expla- 
nation. 
The t-statistic  in  column 5 is the  test  statistic for the hypothesis  that the 
theory’s mean score significantly exceeds that of the theory ranked just below 
it. As you can see, a single-rank difference is statistically significant in only 
four cases. However, eight of the ten two-rank differences are significant at 
the 10 percent level, and all nine three-rank differences are significant at the 
8. To put the estimated standard errors into perspective, some benchmarks may be useful. The 
standard deviation of a multinomial distribution with four equally likely outcomes-I,  2,  3, and 
4-1s  1.12. If the four probabilities are (1/8, 3/8, 3/8, 1/8) instead, the standard deviation drops to 
0.87; if they are (3/8,  1/8,  1/8, 3/8), the standard deviation rises to 1.32. 125  On Sticky Prices: Academic Theories Meet the Real World 
5 percent level. Thus the rankings shown in table 4.4 are sharper than they 
may seem. 
The Accept Rate in column 6 offers an alternative way to rank the theories, 
offered because our numerical scale does not really have the cardinal sig- 
nificance that the rankings in column  1 pretend it has. Column 6 therefore 
reports a simple measure of how many firms accept each theory-the  frac- 
tion of respondents rating the theory as “moderately important” or higher. 
As you can see, the two rankings hardly differ. 
I come now to the puzzling column 7. Nine of the twelve theories apply only 
to firms that have some particular  characteristic. For example, inventories 
cannot explain price stickiness in firms that have no inventories. In each of 
these nine cases, we first pose a preliminary  factual question (for example, 
“Does your firm hold inventories?’),  and proceed to inquire about the theory 
only if the factual question is answered in the affirmative. If not, we skip 
over the theory and score it as “totally unimportant” by definition. The col- 
umn marked Premise? shows the percentage of the sample to which the the- 
ory applies in principle-that  is, for which the factual premise is true. For 
example, 68.3 percent of the firms in our sample say they enter into implicit 
contracts with their customers (as assumed by theory B2). 
The theories  naturally  group  themselves  into  three tiers,  each  with  four 
members. 
The top group scores well-if  we are not too fussy about grading standards! 
If these results are believed, economists interested in the microfoundations of 
sticky prices should be focusing their attention on these four theories. Three 
of them are part of the  modern Keynesian  tradition:  implicit contracts  a la 
Okun (B2), cost-based pricing (B6), and coordination failure (B10). And nom- 
inal contracts (BI) finishes in  fifth place. It is worth noting that two of  the 
theories in the top group (implicit contracts and delivery lags) have especially 
high acceptance rates within their spheres of applicability: 74 percent (that is, 
.505/.683 = .74) and 7  1 percent, respectively. Thus, while there are sectors of 
the economy to which these theories do not apply, they appear to offer quite 
good explanations of price stickiness for the majority of firms. 
The bottom  tier  of  four theories  scores  amazingly  poorly. Remember,  a 
mean score of  1.5 is equivalent to half the firms rejecting the theory outright 
and the other half attaching only “minor importance” to it. That two theories 
(judging quality by price [B3] and hierarchical delays [B9]) actually rate lower 
than this minimum  score is remarkable.9 Unless my  results are way  off the 
mark, these theories deserve to be eliminated from further consideration. The 
inventory-based  theory (B 11) is the only one on the list of twelve in which I 
had  a proprietary interest; I offer this  as evidence that the election was not 
9.  Remember, there was some preselection: I rejected theories that in my judgment seemed fan- 
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rigged. Two of the four theories in the bottom group (constant marginal cost 
[B7] and judging quality by price [B3]) are among the five I selected as having 
garnered the most scholarly attention in the past decade, and so merit more 
extensive discussion. 
About half of the private for-profit economy apparently has the cost struc- 
ture assumed by Hall (1986): marginal cost curves that are flat within the rele- 
vant range. Obviously, the theory does not apply to the other half. But even 
within the half of GDP produced under constant marginal cost (MC), the theo- 
ry’s acceptance rate is a mere 41 percent. Thus it seems most unlikely that 
constant marginal cost is a major factor behind aggregate  price stickiness.i0 
The adverse selection theory fares much worse. The premise that customers 
judge quality by price apparently applies to just one-fifth of GDP; and only half 
of these firms rate it an important cause of price rigidity. Apparently, adverse 
selection is an  important source of  price rigidity in  only  a  corner of  the 
economy. 
In the middle comes a group of  four theories that earn “average” grades:” 
nominal contracts (B l), costs of price adjustment (B8), procyclical elasticity 
(B5), and pricing points (B4). These theoretical bottles are either half full or 
half empty, depending on your tastes. The survey results for these four theories 
will neither persuade a skeptic nor dissuade a believer. In each case, roughly 
half of the firms to which the theory applies rate it as “moderately important” 
or higher. The differences in mean scores stem from the 5  1 percent who report 
the existence of psychological pricing points to the 69 percent who have a 
meaningful volume of nominal contracts. 
The way we posed the questions underlying table 4.4 has two virtues: 
1. It asks each price setter to describe only his own firm’s actuaE behavior, 
rather than deal in hypothetical$. 
2. It does not ask respondents to think or talk abstractly about the reasons 
for sticky prices, but only to react to concrete suggestions. While I consider 
this second virtue extremely important, it does have one drawback: in outlining 
the theories, we may have put ideas into people’s heads. Based on my experi- 
ence in the field, I doubt that this was a major problem. But for those who are 
worried about it, the survey offers an alternative. 
Prior to mentioning any of the twelve theories, we asked each respondent 
the factual question given earlier: 
A10. How often do the prices of your most important products change in a 
typical year? 
10. Even ignoring the difference between real marginal costs (to which the theory applies) and 
nominal  marginal costs. 
11. The average ranking across all theories and all respondents is exactly 2.0. Economists have 
a way to go! On the positive side, however, 89 percent of all firms rated at least one theory a 4 and 
every firm rated at least one theory a 3. 127  On Sticky Prices: Academic Theories Meet the Real World 
Immediately after, we followed up with the question 
AlO(a). Why don’t you change prices more frequently than that? 
This is not the sort of question I like to ask, for it is too abstract and requires 
a great deal of  introspection. It is a bit like asking the proverbial pool player, 
“Why didn’t you  shoot that shot differently?’ Nonetheless, the question did 
give respondents a chance to choose their favorite explanation for price sticki- 
ness before their minds were contaminated by our suggestions. 
Because the question is open-ended, the answers defy neat categorization. 
One hundred seventy-one firms answered; but some gave us two or three re- 
plies, and others answered with some variant of “We change prices as often as 
we please”-suggesting  that they should not have been asked the question in 
the first place. This left 217 usable responses, and table 4.5 is my heroic at- 
tempt to tabulate them in some coherent, albeit admittedly subjective, way. 
The explanation that tops the list, antagonizing customers, is open to various 
interpretations and does not obviously correspond to any of  our theories- 
though it does evoke implicit contracts. Much  the same can be said of  the 
catch-all “competitive pressures,” which reminds one of  coordination failure 
but is also open to other interpretations. After that, however, we can clearly 
recognize several of  the theories listed in table 4.3. Twenty-eight firms cite 
costs of price adjustment. The twenty-seven firms that said they change prices 
infrequently because their costs change infrequently are implicitly agreeing 
with cost-based pricing. An  additional fifteen firms gave answers that evoked 
coordination failure. And nineteen companies mentioned either explicit or im- 
plicit contracts. 
The remainder of the paper looks in more detail at the five theories of great- 
est recent interest. 
Table 4.5  Why Don’t You Change Prices More Frequently Than That? 
(n = 217 responses from 171 firms) 
Response  Number of Firms 
It would antagonize or cause difficulties for our customers 
Competitive pressures 
Costs of  changing prices (BS) 
Our costs do not change more often (B6) 
Coordination failure, price followership (B10) 
Explicit contracts fix prices (Bl) 
Custom or habit 
Regulations 
Implicit contracts with regular customers (B2) 











Note: Bold-faced numbers in the table refer to the theories listed in table 4.3. 128  Alan S. Blinder 
4.3  What Price Setters Think about Coordination Failure 
Coordination failure, the top-rated idea in table 4.4, is old wine in new bot- 
tles. The notion that some industries consist of  a “price leader” and several 
“price followers” is ancient, and has long been used to explain sticky oligopoly 
prices. But it requires a characteristic skewness in the industrial structure and/ 
or begs the question of who becomes the price leader and why. 
Ball and Romer (1991) developed a modern version of this old idea-one 
that is applicable to symmetric and competitive market structures-by  combin- 
ing  menu  costs  with  some theoretical  ideas  set forth  by  Cooper  and  John 
(1988). The basic notion is that firm i’s optimal degree of nominal price flexi- 
bility depends positively on firrnjki2  So, if other firms select high price flexi- 
bility, then firm i will, too. Conversely, firm i will choose sticky prices if other 
firms do so. There are, in a word, multiple equilibria with varying degrees of 
price rigidity. 
We enquired about this theory by posing the following question: 
B 10. The next idea is that firms would often like to raise their prices, but are 
afraid to get out of line with what they expect competitors to charge. They 
do not want to be the first ones to raise prices. But when competing goods 
rise in price, firms raise their own prices promptly. 
How important is this idea in explaining the speed of price adjustment in 
your company? 
Notice that the question is phrased to sound like Ball and Romer’s symmetric 
version of coordination failure, not the classic asymmetric leader/follower pat- 
tern. Nonetheless, a number of  firms answered with  the latter in mind. The 
distribution of responses in the full sample is shown in table 4.6. If we divide 
the sample into five major industrial sectors, the theory ranks first in trade and 
services,  second  in  manufacturing  and  the  transportation-communications- 
utilities composite, and third in construction. If we divide the sample according 
to  (self-reported)  cyclical  sensitivity,  the  coordination  failure  theory  again 
ranks first in each subsample. It seems clear that this is the theory that prac- 
titioners regard most highly.I3 
When we asked those respondents who agreed at least somewhat with the 
theory  why they did not want to go first, the overwhelmingly most frequent 
reply was fear of a large loss of sales if rivals did not match the price increase. 
This fear, by the way, mainly deters price increases, not price decreases, as the 
following question in table 4.7 attests. There is thus strong evidence of asym- 
metry in this theory, but it is in the direction opposite from that usually  as- 
sumed: prices are more rigid upward than downward! 
One thing we would like to understand is the cross-sectional variation  in 
12. This is what Cooper and John (1988) call “strategic complementarity.” 
13. One caveat: table 4.4 shows that its overall rating is not significantly higher than the second- 
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Table 4.6  Distribution of Ratings of the Coordination Failure Theory (n = 198) 
Code  Response  Percentage of  Finns 
1  Totally unimportant  27.5% 
2  Of minor importance  10.6% 
3  Moderately important  19.4% 
4  Very important  42.4% 
Note: Mean response = 2.77. Mean response among those not answering 1 =  3.41. 
Table 4.7  BlO(b). Do You Also Delay Price Cuts Because You Do Not Want to 
Be among the First Firms in the Industry to Cut Prices? (n = 183)” 
Code  Response  Percentage of  Finns 
1  Rarely or never  61.3% 
2  Sometimes  13.8% 
3  Usually or always  24.8% 
Note: Mean response = 1.63. 
”enty  firms answered, “We never cut prices”; hence we have only 163 numerical responses. 
how firms rate the various theories. This can be done by looking at cross tabu- 
lations. But, in a data set with twelve theories and more than 125 variables, the 
number of possible cross tabulations  is enormous. A more efficient way  of 
summarizing the correlations is by estimating regression models with the rat- 
ing of each theory on the left and a variety of explanatory  variables on the 
right. The reader  should understand  that, in  doing so, I am not testing any 
hypotheses. The estimate models are intended merely as convenient summaries 
of  the partial correlations found in the data. 
What is the most appropriate statistical model? In this paper, I estimate an 
ordered probit model for each theory. So, before presenting any results, I ought 
to explain what that model is. 
Suppose we have a categorical variable (like the scores respondents give to 
some theory) which can take on one of k discrete values: 1,2,  3, . . . ,  k. These 
responses are ordinal rather than cardinal-that  is, 4 is bigger than 3, which 
is bigger than 2; but there is no sense in which 4 is twice as big as 2. the 
ordered probit or logit model postulates the existence of  a continuous latent 
variable, call it z, which indicates the firm’s evaluation of the theory. The value 
of variable z for firm i is assumed to be linearly related to a set of regressors, X,: 
(1)  z, = X,b + c + u,, 
and the respondent is presumed to give responsej (j  = 1, . . .  ,k) if 
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In most applications, the lowest bound, a,,,  is taken to be zero and the highest 
bound, ak,  is taken to be infinity. 
The model is completed by the assumption that the cumulative distribution 
function (cdf) of  the random error,  u, is either normal (the ordered probit 
model) or logistic (the ordered logit model). I chose the former for no other 
reason than that it makes it easier to think of  (1) as a linear regression. But 
nothing hinges on this decision; ordered logit models yielded  substantially 
identical results. 
The probability of observing responsej from firm i is the probability that 
a,-, -  X,b -  c <  u, <a, -  Xzb -  c, 
evaluated according to the normal cdf. In what follows, I adopt the notation 
OP(B1) = Xb to connote the ordered probit model explaining the scores of 
theory B 1 by regressors X with coefficients b.  l4 
Estimation is by maximum likelihood, as described in Greene (1990, chap. 
2O).I5 If there are na regressors, the model has m + k parameters: c,  the m- 
vector b, and the (k -  ])-vector a. In most of my applications, k can be as large 
as seven-allowing  for intermediate responses like 3.5. The algorithm usually 
converged rapidly if  m was no larger than, say, ten or twelve. But with larger 
numbers of regressors and smaller numbers of observations,I6 we began push- 
ing the limits of computability. 
The best  fitting ordered probit model for the coordination-failure theory 
(B 10) was (with asymptotic standard errors in parenthese~):'~ 
OP(B10) = .0074 REGULARS + 1.01 REG -  .28 INFL + .13 MC 
(n = 169)  (.0043)  (0.25)  (.11)  (.07) 
(.11)  (. 14)  (0.61)  (.21) 
-.15  INTERVAL -  .35 ACCURACY - 1.18 UNION -.63  IMPLICIT 
logL = -210.7,  pseudo-R2 = .122, linear R2 = ,353. 
The variables will be defined momentarily. In addition to the log likelihood, 
two measures of goodness of fit are offered:IK 
1. The pseudo-R2  is McFadden's statistic, defined as 1 -  L,/L,; where 
L, = the log likelihood for the estimated model, and 
Lo = the log likelihood for a model with only a constant. 
14. Again, see table 4.3 for brief descriptions of  the theories. 
15. The precise model fit is known as the proportional odds model. It is programmed into the 
16. Owing to missing data, the sample size often shrinks when a new  independent variable 
17. Several interviewer dummies were also included in this and subsequent regressions, but 
18. Here, and in what follows, I do not bother to reportp-values for the chi-squared tests of  the 
STATA package. 
is added. 
their coefficients are not shown separately. 
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2. The linear R2 is a concept I invented as a more intuitive measure. It is 
interpreted simply as the RZ  we would get if the latent variable z were actually 
measured and we ran the linear regression  (1). It is a transformation of the 
McFadden measure calibrated by Monte Car10 methods. 
The variables found “significant” in regression (3) are: 
REGULARS = the fraction of sales going to regular customers. Apparently, 
coordination failure is a less important  source of  price stickiness when you 
have off-the-street customers. One interpretation is that it is the regular cus- 
tomers who are angered by unmatched price increases. 
REG = a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has any regulatory restrictions on 
pricing.19 The coefficient means that such firms are much more likely to deem 
coordination failure important. 
INFL = a categorical variable indicating how often the firm uses economy 
wide inflation forecasts in setting prices. I interpret this as an indicator of eco- 
nomic rationality, since any price setter concerned about his desired relative 
price must take forecasts of future inflation into account. The negative coeffi- 
cient means that “smarter” firms are less constrained by coordination failure. 
MC = a categorical variable indicating the shape of the firm’s marginal cost 
function (higher values of MC connote more increasing marginal cost). Appar- 
ently, the coordination failure theory rates better with firms that have rising 
MC curves. 
INTERVAL = a dummy variable  indicating that the firm follows a time- 
dependent (rather than state-dependent) policy for price reviews. It seems nat- 
ural that firms with regular periodic price reviews should be less concerned 
about coordination problems; but the statistical association is weak. 
ACCURACY = a categorical variable indicating how accurately the firm 
can estimate its marginal costs. Those that can do this well apparently worry 
less about coordination. 
UNION = the unionization rate in the firm’s three-digit industry. Thus firms 
in more unionized industries view the coordination theory less favorably. 
IMPLICIT = a dummy variable indicating the presence of implicit contracts 
of  the Okun variety. An Okunesque interpretation of the negative coefficient 
would probably  say that implicit contracts permit price increases when (and 
only when) costs increase-regardless  of whether other firms are raising their 
prices at the same time. 
4.4  What Price Setters Think about Adjustment Costs 
Perhaps the simplest explanation for price stickiness is that firms face ex- 
plicit costs of changing prices. This theory comes in two variants. In the first 
(e.g., Rotemberg 1982), adjustment costs are convex and, where explicit solu- 
19. Truly regulated firms were excluded from the sample. But, for example, firms  in the sample 
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Table 4.8  AlO(b). When You  Do Raise or Lower Prices, Do You Normally Do It 
AIL  at Once or in a Series of Smaller Changes? (n = 198) 
Code  Response  Percentage of Firms 
~  ~~~ 
1  Normally all at once  74.0% 
2  It vanes  9.6% 
3  Normally in small steps  16.4% 
tions  are needed,  quadratic.  More recent  theoretical  efforts  (e.g.,  Mankiw 
1985) focus on models in which a lump sum (“menu cost”) must be paid any 
time the price is changed. 
The two different types of adjustment costs carry starkly different implica- 
tions at the micro level. If adjustment costs are convex, a firm wishing to raise 
its price will do so gradually, in a series of small steps, rather than all at once. 
But if  the costs of price adjustment are lump sum, we should observe infre- 
quent price changes of  sizable magnitude. At  the  macro level,  aggregation 
smooths the adjustment, thereby blurring the distinction between the two mod- 
els. But firm-level micro data offer a rare opportunity for a sharp test. 
We have several such tests in the survey, and they all point strongly toward 
menu costs. First-before  even mentioning adjustment costs-we  asked all 
two hundred firms about their pricing practices. Do they normally adjust prices 
all at once or in a series of small steps? The answers are shown in table 4.8. 
The vote points overwhelmingly toward menu costs-$  adjustment cost is the 
reason behind these responses. 
Later in the interview we turned to adjustment costs explicitly, asking re- 
spondents if their firms really have such costs. Specifically: 
B8(a). Another idea is that the act of changing prices entails special costs in 
itself, so firms hesitate to change prices too frequently or by too much. The 
costs we have in mind are not production costs, but costs like printing new 
catalogs, price lists, etc., or hidden costs like loss of future sales by antago- 
nizing customers, decision-making time of executives, problems with sales- 
people, and so on. 
Does your firm incur such costs when it changes prices? 
Notice that there is at least one item on this list that economists would not 
normally classify as an adjustment cost: the notion that today’s price change 
might affect tomorrow ’s demand curve by “antagonizing customers.” There is 
certainly a danger that respondents might have confused the idea that q,+,  de- 
pends on pr+]  -  pt given p,+,-which  would constitute a genuine adjustment 
cost-with  the  simpler idea that higher p, probably  means  higher p,+]  and 
therefore lower q,+].  Unfortunately,  there seemed to be no way  around this 
problem in the context of an interview.*O 
20. One reader asked why we included “antagonizing customers” on the list at all. The answer 
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Table 4.9  BS(a). Does  Your Company Have Explicit Costs of Price Adjustment? 
(n = 200) 
Code  Response  Percentage of  Firms 
I  No  35.8% 
2  Yes, but trivial  21.3% 
3  Yes  43.0% 
Note:  Mean response = 2.07. 
With this caveat in mind, I proceed to the answers to the question, which are 
shown in table 4.9. What you make of these results depends on how you inter- 
pret the intermediate response, “yes, but trivial.” If  it is viewed as affirming 
the existence of adjustment costs, then firms representing almost two-thirds of 
GDP report having such costs. If, on the other hand, we treat trivial adjustment 
costs as, well, trivial, then the adjustment-cost theory applies to only 43 per- 
cent of the economy. 
The impression that menu costs are the dominant form of  adjustment costs 
was strongly confirmed by  a follow-up question, asked only of firms that re- 
ported having adjustment costs (see table 4.10). By a margin of more than five 
to one, respondents gave the answer associated with menu costs rather than the 
one suggested by  convex costs. 
Note, by the way, that the evidence presented by Carlton (1986) and Kashyap 
(1992) in no way contradicts my finding that menu costs are dominant. Tables 
4.8 and 4.10 suggest that convex adjustment costs apply to around 20 percent 
of  GDP.  Thus it should not  be  hard  to find examples of  very  small price 
changes, But they are the exception, not the rule. 
I come now to the main question about the importance of  the adjustment- 
cost theory. The answers are shown in table 4.11. The theory scores fairly well 
(an average rating of  2.97) among the eighty-five firms that report nontrivial 
adjustment cost. But, since so many companies have either zero or trivial ad- 
justment costs, its overall rating is quite low. The average score of  1.89 (a bit 
below “of minor importance”) places it sixth among the twelve theories tested. 
4.4.1  Adjustment Costs for Quantities? 
Proponents of  the adjustment-cost theory of  price rigidity are often con- 
fronted with the following theoretical question. While there may be adjustment 
costs for changing prices, there surely are adjustment costs for changing quan- 
tities. Why should we believe that the former are greater than the latter? In 
some quarters, this question is thought to be a showstopper: adjustment costs 
for quantities are assumed to be greater than adjustment costs for prices, and 
so the theory is dismissed as an implausible explanation of sticky prices.21 
While the relative size of  the two types of  adjustment costs is surely an 
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Table 4.10  B8(c). Do These Costs of Changing Prices Come Mainly from 
Changing Prices Often or Mainly from Changing Them by Large 
Amounts? (n = 81) 
Code  Response  Percentage of Firms 
1  Mainly from often  69.1  % 
2  Mainly from large amounts  13.6% 
3  Both  17.3% 
Table 4.11  B8. How Important Are Costs of Changing Prices in Slowing Down 
Price Adjustments in Your  Company? (n = 200) 
Code  Response  Percentage of  Firms 
1  Totally unimportant  59.3%* 
2  Of minor importance  9.8% 
3  Moderately important  14.3% 
4  Very important  16.8% 
Nore: Mean response = 1.89. Mean among those reporting nontrivial costs = 2.97. Rank = sixth. 
*This includes seventy-one firms that said they have no adjustment costs. 
empirical issue, it cannot be  resolved  with standard data since we have no 
direct measurements of  these costs. The survey offered a unique way  of  ap- 
proaching this issue, and we did so through a series of  questions. First, we 
asked  firms  whether  they  prefer  to  adjust  price  or output  when  demand 
changes. Most prefer output adjustments,  as table 4.12 shows. Notice once 
again the indication that prices  are more sticky upward than downward: the 
vast majority prefer to raise production rather than price when demand rises, 
but only a slim majority prefer to cut volume rather than price when demand 
falls. 
We followed each of these questions with the simple query “Why is that?” 
Since the inquiry was open-ended, the answers are not easy to summarize, and 
doing so would take far too long. Suffice it to say that relatively few firms cited 
costs of price adjustment as the reason for their preference. 
Finally, we asked directly whether the firm  also has explicit costs of  chang- 
ing output: 
BS(j). Do you incur special costs from the act of changing your produc- 
tion-analogous  to the special costs you incur when you change prices? We 
have in mind things like temporary halts in production, expenses in recruit- 
ing new workers, etc. (n = 77) 
The answers were as follows: no-34.4  percent; yes, but minor-23.4  percent; 
yes-42.2  percent. 
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adjustment costs for changing production. While the sample distributes itself 
somewhat evenly across the three categories, one should remember that this 
question was asked only of firms that reported meaningful costs of adjusting 
prices. Thus I read the responses as suggesting that, contrary to intuition, ad- 
justment costs for quantities may  well be smaller than adjustment costs for 
prices. 
4.4.2  Correlates of Adjustment Costs 
What kinds of  firms believe that costs of changing prices are a significant 
factor behind price stickiness? I approach this question by estimating two or- 
dered probit models. The first explains ADJ, a categorical variable indicating 
the presence or absence of adjustment costs, that is, the response to question 
B8(a) above, coded as follows: 
1 = no 
2 = yes, but trivial 
3 = yes 
Then, only for firms that answer either 2 or 3 to this question, I estimate an 
ordered probit model for the answer to question B8-the  firm’s evaluation of 
the adjustment-cost theory. 
The best-fitting equations are 
(4)  OP(ADJ) = -  1.47 RET -  1.03 WHOLE -  1.5  1 CON 
(n = 169)  (.47)  (.36)  (.38) 
(.004)  (.12)  (.W  (.07) 
(.11)  (.21)  (.Of9  (.I31 
+.010 CONSUMER -.29  CYCLICAL + .36 INFL -.13  CONTRACTS 
+ .17 INTERVAL -  .34 LOYAL -  .17 MC + .23 INVENTORY, 
logL = -  154.1; pseudo-R2 = .198; linear R2 = S08. 
OP(B8) = 0.76 MFG + 1.41 SERV + .91 TCU 
(n  = 112) (.33)  (.45)  (54) 
(5) 
Table 4.12  Reactions to Changes in Demand (BS(0, [h]. When your demand 
rises [falls], do you normally prefer to raise [decrease] your 
production, increase [cut] your prices, or both? [n = 78 (76)]) 
Percentage of Firms when 
Code  Response  Demand Rises  Demand Falls 
1  Level of production  61.5%  36.8% 
2  Prices  4.5%  27.0% 
3  Both  34.0%  36.2% 136  Alan S. Blinder 
-  .44 CYCLICAL -. 15 CONTRACTS 
(.I31  (.08) 
(.23)  (.0%  (.I71 
-.64  LOYAL +.28 MC + .37 INVENTORY; 
logL = -  151.9; pseudo-R* = .143; linear R2 = .401. 
As earlier, asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
The fit of these regressions is good. Indeed, the first is extraordinary for a 
model with categorical data-equivalent  to an RZ  of  .5 1 in a linear regression 
of  the latent variable on the regressors. The significant righthand variables are 
RET, WHOLE, CON, MFG, SERV, TCU = a set of dummy variables for 
retailing, wholesaling, construction, manufacturing, service industries, and a 
composite of transportation, communications, and utilities. 
Thus the coefficients in the two equations mean that the trade (especially 
retail trade) and construction sectors are considerably less likely than the oth- 
ers (a)  to have significant adjustment costs, and (b)  to view such costs as an 
important source of sticky prices, even if they have them. In the case of con- 
struction, this is to be expected: for the most part, each sale has its own unique 
price. In the case of retail trade, however, this may be a bit surprising. After 
all, the phrase “menu  costs”  derives  from a retailing application.  However, 
what made Mankiw’s (1985) paper so interesting was his demonstration that 
presumably small adjustment costs could account for sizable rigidities. 
CONSUMER = the fraction of output sold to consumers. The strong posi- 
tive coefficient in equation (4) is as expected; it means that adjustment costs 
are larger when you sell to consumers rather than to businesses. However, this 
does not carry over to equation (5). The importance of adjustment costs as a 
cause of price  rigidity  is apparently  independent  of  whether the  firm sells 
mainly to consumers or businesses. 
CYCLICAL = a categorical variable indicating whether the firm is cycli- 
cally sensitive or insensitive (self-reported). The strongly negative coefficients 
in both  regressions mean  that cyclically sensitive firms both  report  smaller 
adjustment costs and see them as a less important source of sticky prices. Per- 
haps this is because firms with volatile  demand curves arrange their affairs 
this way. 
CONTRACTS = a categorical variable indicating the fraction of sales made 
under written contracts. The negative coefficients in both equations mean that 
firms that sell more under written contracts wony less about adjustment costs, 
as is to be expected. 
INTERVAL, defined earlier, gets a weak positive coefficient in equation (4), 
which  is puzzling; but it  is not  significant  in equation  (5). Perhaps regular 
periodic price reviews are costly even though they do not rigidify prices. 
LOYAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that lose their less loyal 
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theory). The source of the correlation here is far from obvious, but it is quite 
strong. Firms that accept this premise are much less likely to see adjustment 
costs as important. 
MC was defined earlier: higher values connote more steeply sloped MC 
curves. Curiously, the coefficients are of opposite signs in the two equations. 
The negative coefficient in equation (4) and positive coefficient in equation (5) 
mean that firms with more upward-sloping MC curves report smaller adjust- 
ment costs for changing prices but nonetheless attribute more importance to 
the theory. 
INVENTORY = a dummy variable indicating whether the firm holds inven- 
tories of finished goods.22  Such firms apparently have larger costs of price ad- 
justment and view these costs as a more important source of  price rigidity. 
This finding may reflect conscious decisions in firms’ choices of  pricing and 
inventory technologies. A flexible inventory policy makes it easier to vary sales 
instead ofprices when demand fluctuates-which  is just what you would want 
to do if it was costly to adjust prices but not very costly to adjust sales. 
4.5  What Price Setters Think about Countercyclical Markups 
There are many theories of countercyclical markups, but some are uniquely 
unsuited to this type of investigation. For example, we cannot very well ask 
firms whether oligopolistic collusion is more effective at cyclical peaks or 
troughs. The version we did try to test assumes that countercyclical markups 
derive from procyclical elasticity of demand. This is an old idea, dating back at 
least to Pigou (1927) and recently revived by Bils (1989) and Shapiro (1988). 
The specific version tested in the survey posits that firms have  different 
classes of customers who vary systematically  in their price and income elastici- 
ties of  demand. More loyal customers have lower elasticities and less loyal 
customers have higher ones. Thus, as the firm’s  demand curve shifts inward 
during a recession, its customer base becomes less price-elastic. 
For purposes of the questionnaire, the idea was translated as follows: 
B5(a). It  has been suggested that, when business turns down, a company 
loses its least loyal customers first and retains its most loyal ones. Since the 
remaining customers are not very sensitive to price, reducing markups will 
not stimulate sales very much. 
Is this idea true in your company? 
The sample divided roughly 60/40 on this question, with 114 firms answering 
“yes” and 8 1 answering “no.” 
Notice an ambiguity in the way the question is worded-one  which I delib- 
erately let stand. The change in a firm’s customer base when its sales decline 
22. This question is not asked of service firms; instead they are automatically coded as holding 
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presumably  depends on whether the drop in  sales is economywide,  indus- 
trywide, or specific to the firm. In addition, a firm’s elasticity of demand should 
depend  on how  its competitors  react  when  it changes  its  price.  Rightly  or 
wrongly, I judged these matters too complex-and  too wordy-to  be embod- 
ied in the question, and so left it to each firm to answer under whatever blend 
of ceteris paribus and mutatis mutandis conditions seemed most relevant. That, 
of course, leaves significant ambiguity over what respondents were assuming. 
We followed this question by asking the 114 firms that accepted the theoreti- 
cal premise what they thought of it as an explanation for sticky prices: 
B5. How important is it in explaining the speed of price adjustment in your 
company? 
The answers, which are displayed in table 4.13, fall somewhat short of a ring- 
ing endorsement of the theory. Taken at face value, they imply that the notion 
that cyclical shifts in customer loyalty account for price stickiness has no em- 
pirical relevance  at all for 56 percent  of American industry and substantial 
relevance for only 3 1 percent. 
When we disaggregate the responses by industry, manufacturing and retail- 
ing stand out as the two sectors of the economy in which this theory has the 
most validity. 
4.5.1 
It is of interest to know, first, what kinds of firms believe they can distinguish 
among customer groups identified by loyalty, for only such firms can possibly 
find this theory of any importance. One way to summarize these cross-sectional 
differences is in the following ordered probit regression (all variable  names 
but one have been previously defined): 
Correlates of Agreement with the Theory 
(6)  OP(L0YAL) = .54 IMPLICIT -  .33 CYCLICAL -  .26 ADJ 
(n = 179)  (.22)  (.12)  (.13) 
(.39)  (.OOOO 1  ) 
-  .90 CON -  .00002 SIZE; 
logL = -101.6,  pseudo-R2 = .163, linear R2 = .443. 
Table 4.13  B5. How Important is Procyclical Elasticity in Slowing Down Price 
Adjustments in Your Company? (n = 195) 
Code  Response  Percentage of  Firms 
1  Totally unimportant*  55.9% 
3  Moderately important  21.5% 
4  Very important  9.74 
2  Of minor importance  12.8% 
Note: Mean response = 1.85. Mean among those accepting the premise: 2.46 (n = 114). Rank 
= seventh. 
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The fit of the model is excellent as these things go. It makes sense that firms 
with implicit contracts draw a clear distinction between “loyal” and other cus- 
tomers, and perhaps it makes sense that larger firms do not (the variable SIZE 
measures annual sales). But I  see no obvious intuitive explanations for the 
other three coefficients. 
I turn now to the evaluation of the theory. What kinds of firms find the procy- 
clical elasticity theory  an  important factor behind  sticky prices? The best 
ordered-probit model explaining the answers to the main theory question wasz3 
(7)  OP(B5) = .44 CYCLICAL + 1.15 NONPRICE -  .I2  MC 
(n = 100) (.14)  (.34)  (.09) 
+ .018 FIXED + SO  RATION + 1.37 RETAIL + .47 MFG 
(.006)  (.I41  (53)  (.32) 
+ .27 ACCURACY -  .016 GOVT -.56  POINTS -.24  INVENTORY 
(.19)  (.009)  (.29)  (. 18) 
logL = -  108.4, pseudo-R2 = ,221, linear R2 = S48. 
These results seem very  erratic and hard to explain.24  The only regressor 
common  to  both  equations-CYCLICAL-has  opposite  signs  in  each.25 
Firms with rising marginal costs are actually less likely to agree with the pro- 
cyclical elasticity theory, which is unfortunate since the idea is meant to ex- 
plain constant price in the face of rising MC. But the coefficient is not signifi- 
cant at conventional standards. The new variables appearing in (7) are 
NONPRICE = a dummy for competing on nonprice elements instead of 
price. The highly significant positive coefficient may indicate that these firms 
elect not to compete on price because of elasticity pessimism. 
FIXED = the percentage of costs that are fixed. Since relatively high fixed 
costs mean relatively low marginal costs, these two cost variables (MC and 
FIXED) may be picking out firms that base prices more on costs and less on 
demand. However, the positive coefficient on ACCURACY-a  categorical 
variable indicating how well firms think they know their marginal costs-ar- 
gues against this interpretation. 
RATION = a categorical variable indicating the frequency with which cus- 
tomers are rationed in what they may buy. Firms that do so frequently appar- 
ently place less faith in procyclical elasticity. 
POINTS = a categorical variable indicating the presence or absence of psy- 
chological pricing points-as  suggested by Kashyap (1992). For some reason, 
firms with such pricing points are less likely to attribute importance to pro- 
cyclical elasticity. 
23. This equation was estimated only for firms that answered 2 (“yes”) to equation B5(a). 
24. The small sample size for equation (7) may be playing a role here. 
25. However, the industry results are consistent in that CON gets a negative coefficient in (6) 
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The dummy variables RETAIL and MFG show that retailers are much more 
likely, and manufacturers slightly more likely, to see their customer base as 
divided into loyal and disloyal segments. I had no particular priors on these 
industry dummies. 
Finally, firms that hold inventories (INVENTORY) or sell more to the gov- 
ernment (GOVT) are less likely to believe in procyclical elasticity. 
4.6  What Price Setters Think about Constant Marginal Cost 
Go back to thinking of the elasticity  of demand as a constant. If  marginal 
cost is also constant, then price should be, too. That simple idea is almost a 
theory of  price rigidity  over the business cycle, but  it leaves one important 
loose end. The demand and cost functions of micro theory implicitly apply to 
relative prices and real marginal costs. The theory therefore really says that 
markups are constant over the business cycle. Nominal prices are sticky only 
if nominal input costs are. 
Although neither price stickiness nor constancy of MC was his primary con- 
cern, Robert Hall (1986) revived interest in this very old idea. Hall’s goal was 
to explain procyclical productivity by appealing to market power-markups 
of price over marginal cost. Constant MC entered the picture to resolve a para- 
dox that Hall pointed out: the high degree of market power that he estimated 
on U.S.  data is hard to reconcile with the comparatively low level of business 
profits. 
Hall’s explanation was that fixed costs (“excess capacity”) are substantial. 
Thus he envisions a world in which the typical marginal cost curve is flat up 
to capacity and then nearly vertical. A competitive firm producing on the flat 
portion of its MC curve with P  = MC is not making any contribution to its 
fixed costs. Therefore, to cover fixed costs in the long run, it must  spend a 
reasonable amount of time on the vertical portion of its MC curve-with  high 
prices in periods of peak demand. Hence prices should be cyclically sensitive. 
But a firm with substantial market power need do no such thing. Since it main- 
tains P  above MC all the time, it is constantly earning a contribution toward 
its fixed costs. That is why, in Hall’s (1986, 315) words, “a finding of market 
power points in the direction of constant marginal cost.” 
Notice the highly qualified phrase “points in the direction of.” High fixed 
costs do not imply that marginal cost must be flat, and Hall makes no such 
claim. Instead, he uses a kind of  “menu cost” argument to suggest that MC 
curves are flat: if they are, then the cost of price rigidity is small because profits 
drop only slightly when output deviates from its profit-maximizing level. 
To believe in constant marginal cost as a theory of price rigidity, you must 
accept two premises: first, that marginal costs are constant, and second, that 
this constancy is an important source of sticky prices. Hence, I again evaluate 
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First, how are firms’ marginal cost curves really shaped? This turned out to 
be a tricky question because the term marginal cost is not in the lexicons of 
most businesspeople;  the concept  itself may not even be a natural one. For 
purposes of the survey, we translated “marginal cost” into “variable costs of 
producing additional units,” and posed the following question: 
B7(a).  Some companies find that their variable costs per unit are roughly 
constant when production rises. Others incur either higher or lower variable 
costs of producing additional units when they raise production. 
How would you characterize the behavior of your own variable costs of 
producing additional units as production rises? 
This proved a difficult question. It often had to be repeated, rephrased, or 
explained. Even so, 10 of our 200 respondents were unable to answer it. The 
other 190 executives answered in their own words, sometimes at great length, 
and interviewers classified the responses into one of five categories offered on 
the questionnaire. The simplest way of summarizing the answers is graphically. 
Figure 4.1 depicts five possible shapes for the MC curve and the fraction of 
firms selecting each. The spikes in panels b and d indicate cases in which costs 
jump discretely when  output crosses certain critical thresholds-as  when  a 
bank opens a new branch office or a railroad adds an additional car. 
When juxtaposed against the standard neoclassical assumption that panel e 
is the rule, the answers are stunning. Only 11 percent of firms report that their 
MC curves are rising (panel e). By contrast, 40.5 percent claim that their MC 
curves are falling, presumably globally (panels a and b).26  The good news for 
the constant-marginal-cost theory is that approximate constancy of MC (panels 
c and d) is the modal case-encompassing  48.4 percent of GDP. The bad news 
is that this group accounts for less than half of GDP and that almost as many 
firms say they havefulling  MC. If anything, it appears that Hall did not go far 
enough in arguing against the standard neoclassical view that the MC curve is 
upward sloping. 
My own experience  as an interviewer leads me to discount these results 
somewhat because many executives had difficulty understanding the question. 
Some may have confused marginal cost with average cost (AC), and it is surely 
not surprising that many firms have falling AC curves. Nonetheless,  the dis- 
count would have to be pretty severe before we read figure 4.1 as saying that 
rising MC is the norm. In any case, we certainly could not ask firms that denied 
having constant MC whether constant MC is an important  source of sticky 
prices.  So the main question about the theory was posed only to  firms that 
classified themselves in panels c or d of figure 4.1  -a  total of ninety-two com- 
panies. The others were automatically coded as answering “totally unimport- 
ant” to the following question: 
26. Ramey  (1991) offers econometric evidence for declining MC in seven industries, six of 
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Fig. 4.1  Possible shapes of marginal cost curves 
B7. It has been suggested that many firms base prices on costs. Hence firms 
with constant variable costs per unit have no reason to change prices when 
production changes. 
How important is this idea in explaining the speed of price adjustment in 
your company? (n = 90) 
Table 4.14 summarizes the answers; they give the theory a pretty poor rating. 
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either because their MC curves are not flat (52 percent) or because they do not 
see constant MC as an important cause of  price rigidity (21 percent). Only 
about 20 percent of respondents accept the theory in the sense that they give it 
a rating of 3 or higher. The average score of  1.57 on the four-point scale is low 
in an absolute sense and ranks the theory ninth of  the twelve evaluated in the 
survey. Even within the population of  firms that report flat MC  curves, the 
theory’s average rating is only 2.19. Simply put, it seems most unlikely that 
constant marginal cost is an important factor behind macroeconomic price 
rigidity. 
4.6.1  Correlates of the Theory 
Few variables carry any predictive power for the shape of the firm’s marginal 
cost curve, that is, for the appropriate panel in figure 4.1. Even the ordered 
probit models that best predict the answers have exceedingly modest fits: 
(8)  OP(MC) = .40 POINTS -  .24 ADJ -  .23 MFG 
(n = 190) (.17)  (.lo) 
logL = -248.5,  pseudo-R2 = .049, linear R2 = .17, 
OP(MC) = .40 POINTS -  .25 ADJ -  .39 MFG  (9) 
(n = 154) (.19)  (.11)  (.21) 
(.0024)  (.23) 
-  .0034 ELAST -  .41 REG; 
logL = -  195.0, pseudo-R2 = .089, linear R2 = .274. 
The sample size is much smaller in the second regression because the variable 
ELAST (the elasticity of demand) is missing in almost 20 percent of the obser- 
vations.  It  gets  a  not-very-significant negative coefficient, indicating  that 
steeper MC functions are associated with less elastic demand curves. 
The two regressions show that manufacturers (MFG) are less likely than 
other firms to have increasing marginal costs, as are firms with substantial costs 
Table 4.14  B7. How Important Is Constant Marginal Cost in Explaining the 
Speed of Price Adjustment in Your Company? (n = 190) 
Code  Response  Percentage of Firms 
1  Totally unimportant*  73.1% 
2  Of minor importance  7.2% 
3  Moderately important  9.0% 
4  Very important  10.6% 
Note:  Mean response = 1.57. Mean among those with constant marginal cost: 2.19 (n = 90). 
Rank =  ninth. 
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of adjusting prices (ADJ). The variable REG indicates that (partially) regulated 
firms are more likely to havefulling  MC curves, as is to be expected. 
The other significant variable is POINTS. For some reason, firms that have 
pricing points are also more likely to report rising MC. 
Many more variables correlate with a firm’s evaluation of the importance of 
constant MC as an explanation of sticky prices, given that they have constant 
MC. But here statistical inference starts to get thin because the sample is so 
small. (Only ninety-two firms report constant MC curves.) The following equa- 
tion fits (overfits?) the data extremely well: 
(10)  OP(B7) = -3.36  MFG + 5.78 UNION 
(n = 77)  (0.55)  (1.39) 
-  .22 CONTRACTS -  .87 INTERVAL 
(.I31  (.23) 
+ .70 IMPLICIT - 1.06 JUDGE - 1.21 POINTS + 1.25 LOYAL 
(.40)  (0.44)  (.37)  (0.37) 
(0.29)  (.22)  (.012) 
+ 1.61 INVENTORY + .77 ADJ + .033 GOVT 
logL = -65.9,  pseudo-R2 = .407, linear R2 = ,737. 
All of these variables have appeared previously, except for JUDGE-a  dummy 
variable for whether the firm’s customers judge quality by price (see the next 
theory). 
Given the tenuous statistical foothold of these estimates, it is probably inad- 
visable to make much of them. Taken at face value, they say that firms are more 
likely to see constant marginal cost as an important source of sticky prices if 
they have adjustment costs for changing prices (ADJ), enter into implicit con- 
tracts with their customers (IMPLICIT), and have the kind of customer loyalty 
assumed in the previous theory (LOYAL). These all make intuitive sense, al- 
though ADJ gets the opposite sign in equations (8) and (9). But firms also 
rate the constant-MC theory higher if  they are in more unionized industries 
(UNION), sell more to government (GOVT), and hold inventories of finished 
goods (INVENTORY); there is no clear explanation for these correlations. 
On the negative side, firms attribute less importance to  the constant-MC 
theory if  they are in manufacturing (which reinforces equations [8] and [9]), 
if  they sell more under written contracts (CONTRACTS), and if  they have 
periodic price reviews (INTERVAL). These findings seem intuitive. But it is 
far from clear why constant MC should be less important  when customers 
judge quality by price (JUDGE) or have pricing points (POINTS). 
4.7  What Price Setters Think about Judging Quality by Price 
Few topics in economic theory were hotter in the 1980s than imperfect in- 
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dreds of papers were written exploring the implications of adverse selection 
and moral hazard in such markets. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
the rule book of economic theory was substantially rewritten. Joseph Stiglitz 
(1987), for example, referred to the repeal of the law of supply and demand. 
Adverse selection, in particular, has been offered by Stiglitz and several co- 
authors as an explanation of why wages, prices, and interest rates do not fall 
promptly to clear markets. The application to price rigidity is straightforward: 
firms may hesitate to cut prices in slack markets out of fear that their customers 
will  infer (incorrectly) that product quality has been reduced. Allen (1988) 
developed an explicit formal model of a related  idea in which unobservable 
quality differences  make prices  sticky as long as demand  shocks are suffi- 
ciently serially  correlated.  I  think it fair to say  that the notion  that judging 
quality by price might inhibit price reductions  has come into common cur- 
rency. 
Unfortunately, no one knows whether this theory has any empirical validity. 
Do firms really believe that their customers judge quality by price? Is that why 
prices  do not fall in slumps? In a sense, the adverse selection theory is the 
quintessential example of  why I chose the survey method to study price sticki- 
ness. The theory is not just untested, it is virtually untestable by conventional 
methods. After all, the basic premise is that certain critical dimensions of qual- 
ity are unobservable-even  by the people who buy the product. How,  then, 
can any objective data tell the econometrician whether or not the theory is true? 
If their own words are to be believed, actual price setters do not believe that 
judging quality by price inhibits price reductions. This theory was assessed by 
asking the following question: 
B3(a). Another idea is that firms hesitate to reduce their prices because they 
fear that customers will interpret a price cut as a signal that the quality of 
the product has been reduced. 
(a) Is this idea true in your company? 
If (a) was answered in the affirmative, we followed with: 
B3. How important is it in discouraging or delaying price decreases in your 
company? 
As table 4.15 shows, this theory rates flat last among the twelve theories 
tested, with a mean score of just 1.33 on the one-to-four scale. This is an amaz- 
ingly negative evaluation. The main factor behind this dismal showing is that 
the vast majority of firms-78.5  percent to be precise-simply  do not believe 
that their customers would  “interpret a price cut as a signal that the quality 
of the product has been reduced.” Among those that do, the theory attains a 
respectable average score of 2.56. But there are simply too few such firms to 
have much of an impact in the aggregate. 
These negative results hold more or less across the board. The theory ranks 
last in manufacturing, utilities, and construction; second to last (with a mean 
score of  only  1.20!) in trade;  and third from last in the  service sector. The 146  Alan S. Blinder 
Table 4.15  B3. How Important Is Judging Quality by Price in Discouraging or 
Delaying Price Decreases in Your Company? (n = 200 responses) 
Code  Response  Percentage of Firms 
1  Totally unimportant*  81.5% 
3  Moderately important  6.3% 
2  Of minor importance  8.0% 
4  Very important  4.3% 
Nore: Mean response = 1.33. Mean if quality is judged by price: 2.56 (n = 42). Rank = twelfth. 
*This category includes firms that answer “no” to question B3(a). 
theory’s few boosters seem to be concentrated in the service sector. Of  the 
twenty companies giving the theory a score of 3 or better, eleven sell services. 
4.7.1  Correlates of Judging Quality by Price 
As these things go, our ability to model econometrically which firms find 
judging quality by  price an important source of  price rigidity is reasonable. 
The best ordered-probit model was (with asymptotic standard errors in paren- 
theses): 
(11)  OP(JUDGE) = -.51  TRADE -1.14  CON -  .0055 BUSINESS 
(n = 190)  (.36)  (0.61)  (.004  1) 
+ .32 INFL + .85 POINTS -.21  RATION + .39 REG; 
(.I51  (.27)  (.  14)  (.m 
LogL = -74.9;  pseudo-R2 = ,200, linear R2 = .513 
The one new variable in this regression is BUSINESS-the  fraction of out- 
put sold to other businesses. Its negative coefficient indicates that judging qual- 
ity by  price is less prevalent in business-to-business transactions, as is to be 
expected. The other right-hand variables have appeared before. 
Surprisingly, especially given the negative coefficient on BUSINESS, com- 
panies in wholesale and retail trade are less likely to believe that their cus- 
tomers judge quality by price. 
There is apparently less judging of quality by  price in construction (CON), 
which may or may not be surprising. 
Firms that believe that their customers have  psychological pricing points 
(POINTS) also tend to believe that their customers judge quality by  price. 
Perhaps psychological manipulability is a generic trait. 
Firms  which ration  their  customers more  frequently (RATION) are less 
likely to report that their customers judge quality by price, perhaps because 
their products tend to be standardized. 
Judging quality by  price is more common among firms that are subject to 
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INFL is a puzzling  variable.  The positive  coefficient means  that  “smart” 
firms are more likely to report that their customers judge quality by price. 
Have they been reading Joe Stiglitz? 
4.8  Summary 
Direct survey evidence supports the common macroeconometric finding that 
changes in P lag behind changes in M. Indeed, almost 80 percent of GDP is 
repriced quarterly or less frequently.  And the typical lag of  a price change 
behind  a shock to either demand or cost is about three months. That much 
price stickiness appears to be enough to give monetary policy a handle on the 
real economy. 
Or is it? The answer depends on the sources of all this stickiness. Five theo- 
ries of sticky prices were popular in the academy during the 1980s, but only 
one of them is also popular with actual decision makers: coordination failure. 
Apparently, many firms hesitate to change their prices for fear that competi- 
tors will not follow suit. In fact, this is the most popular theory among the 
twelve tested in the survey. However, our respondents tell us that the resulting 
price rigidity  is asymmetric  in the direction  opposite  from that usually  as- 
sumed. Firms are more likely to delay price increases out of fear that competi- 
tors might  not  match them than they  are to delay price decreases. Thus, if 
coordination failure were the only source of sticky prices (which it is not), the 
real effects of monetary expansions would be greater than those of monetary 
contractions. As Ball and Romer (1991) note, the most obvious policy implica- 
tion of  the model is that more coordinated wage and price setting-somehow 
achieved-could  improve welfare.  But if  this proves difficult or  impossible, 
the door is opened to activist monetary policy to cure recessions. 
The worst of  the five theories, according to our respondents, is the notion 
that firms hesitate to cut prices in slumps because they fear that customers will 
misconstrue price cuts as signals of reductions in quality. Hardly  any of the 
two hundred firms interviewed believe their customers behave this way; those 
that do are mostly in services. Although this idea has attracted an enormous 
following  in  academia,  it  seems to have virtually  no following  in  the real 
The simple theory that flat marginal cost curves underlie price rigidity fares 
only slightly better. About half of the GDP is apparently produced under condi- 
tions of constant MC. But even this group does not see constant MC as a ter- 
ribly important source of sticky prices. This means that, for many such firms, 
the markup between price and marginal cost is cyclically variable, not con- 
stant. One fascinating finding from the survey is that about 40 percent of GDP 
is produced under falling marginal costs, though it is certainly possible that 
27. The basic idea of  adverse selection may well be important in other contexts. But Blinder 
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many  respondents  confused average with  marginal  cost  in  answering  this 
question. 
Most modern theories of cyclically sensitive markups make markups count- 
ercyclical, not procyclical. One such theory was tested in the survey and found 
wanting: the idea that the price elasticity of demand falls in slumps and rises 
in booms. Our respondents favored the premise by a margin of 58.5 percent to 
41.5 percent, but did not view it as a fundamental source of price stickiness.** 
Last, but not least, the survey taught us a great deal about the nature and 
validity of the theory that price rigidity stems from adjustment costs. 
First, there are strong indications that adjustment costs for changing prices 
are more often fixed (menu costs) than convex. But since about 20 percent of 
the economy may have convex adjustment costs, empirical findings that some 
firms make very small price changes should not be construed as rejection of 
the menu-cost theory. 
Second, while the menu-cost idea is symmetric in theory, it appears to be 
strongly asymmetric in practice. Firms tell us that adjustment costs more often 
deter price increases than price decreases. This makes it most unlikely that 
adjustment costs have much to do with printing new price lists, etc. 
Third, adjustment costs are an important source of price rigidity within the 
approximately 40 to 45 percent of the economy that reports nontrivial adjust- 
ment costs. 
Fourth, the common objection that costs of changing quantities must dwarf 
any costs of changing prices has much less validity than is commonly sup- 
posed. In fact, many of our decision makers seem to be saying that the former 
are smaller than the latter. 
I cannot resist closing with a conclusion about methodology rather than sub- 
stance. I think this survey demonstrates that we can learn things of interest by 
asking actual decision makers to tell us about their behavior. If the survey ap- 
proach is right, people will cooperate. If the questions are well-posed, people 
will give thoughtful and coherent answers. Some of the information we can 
learn through attitudinal surveys can apparently be obtained in no other way. 
I would be the last to argue that other more conventional modes of economic 
inquiry should be abandoned. But the law of diminishing returns suggests that 
learning by asking, the most underutilized of all economic research tools, may 
now offer high returns. The total cost of this research project was the equiva- 
lent of about two standard National Science Foundation grants to senior re- 
searchers.  Who doubts that  the  survey described here  added  more  to our 
knowledge than two such typical grants? 
28. I should not overstate the case. Among the 58.5 percent that accept the premise, the theory 
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COnlment  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
On Methodology 
In his conclusion, Alan Blinder challenges us: “Who doubts that the survey 
described here added more to our knowledge than two such typical [National 
Science Foundation] grants?’  As Blinder was embarking on his study, I was 
sure I would not be among the doubters. I believed that we would get fairly 
sharp answers as to what firms viewed as important or unimportant, and that 
this would help focus further theorizing. I must admit to being disappointed 
by the results. 
Look at table 4.4, and take the ratio of column 6, the acceptance rate, to 
column 7,  the proportion of firms for which the premise of the theory is at all 
applicable. For nine out of twelve theories, the ratio is above 46 percent. For 
seven out of twelve, the ratio is between 46 percent and 60  percent. The image 
this evokes and that recurs throughout my reading of the results is, that con- 
fronted with the twelve statements, the firms often had the reaction: “Now that 
you say it, yes, maybe that is kind of  what we do.” 
There is, I suspect, a lesson here about the limits of the approach that Blinder 
has taken in the survey. Firms do think about pricing in their own way. Pre- 
sented with short summaries of  alternative  academic theories, they find that 
most capture something, but that none is quite right.  Role reversal  may be 
useful here. Suppose that a businessman decided to find out how economists 
thought about inflation. Having drawn a list of  theories-inflation  is due to 
money growth; inflation is due to changes in relative prices; inflation is due to 
budget deficits, inflation is due to union militancy, inflation come from depreci- 
ation, and so on-he  came to Blinder and asked him to rank the theories from 
1 to 4. Blinder would boil at the idea of being so constrained in his answers, 
but would see most statements as having a grain of truth, and would give a lot 
of 2s and 3s. Being an academic, he would then qualify his answers at length. 
But businessmen are not academics. They may not have a clear, explicit view 
of how they set prices, and may not want to spend the time needed to qualify 
their answers. Thus, they give the 2s and the 3s, do not bother qualifying very 
much, but it does not quite capture what they do. 
Olivier Jean Blanchard is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology 
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It is interesting to contrast the approach taken by  Blinder to that recently 
taken by Truman Bewley and Bill Brainard in asking firms about wage setting 
(Bewley and Brainard 1993). Bewley and Brainard also start from the idea that 
we can learn a lot from listening to firms. But in sharp contrast to Blinder, 
Bewley and Brainard act like psychoanalysts, remaining mostly silent as per- 
sonnel officers explain what they do and why they do it. The picture which 
comes out is both rich and confusing. Whether and how the arguments used 
by firms relate to our theories of wage setting is often unclear. But what is clear 
is that the interviewees would not have felt at ease evaluating the relevance of 
our various theories of fairness, efficiency wages, and so on, had they been put 
to them as short statements. 
On Price Stickiness 
Macroeconomists  have  long believed  in  two  stylized  facts  about  price- 
setting by firms. The first is that, given factor costs, prices do not respond to 
demand shifts very much. The second is that most prices are not set continu- 
ously, leading to lags in the response of prices to their underlying determinants. 
In the 1980s, these two stylized facts have come to be known as “real rigidities” 
for the first, and “nominal rigidities” for the second. I am not sure the terminol- 
ogy is felicitous. But it is convenient, and I shall use it. 
Both facts have been seen as contributing to the slow adjustment of the price 
level to movements in aggregate demand. But they have also been seen as re- 
quiring quite  separate explanations. To  explain the first, the weak effect of 
demand shifts on prices given factor prices, most of us have looked for expla- 
nations based on imperfect competition. The intellectual challenge here, and 
not a small one at that, has been perceived to be the development of  a theory 
of  imperfect  competition  which  delivered  such  behavior.  In  contrast,  ex- 
plaining the second has appeared to most of us to be rather trivial: continuous 
price setting is obviously very costly. Rather, the challenge has been perceived 
to show how small lags at the microlevel may, through the interactions between 
the  firms’  decisions,  lead to  large  price-level  inertia  and  large  macroeco- 
nomic costs. 
Obviously the dichotomy I have drawn between “real” and “nominal” rigidi- 
ties is too sharp. Rather trivially, one can only have discrete price setting if 
there are price setters; there can be price setters only if they have at least tran- 
sient monopoly power, thus if  there is imperfect competition. Also, if  firms 
decide not to change prices in response to demand shifts, then everything else 
being equal, there is one less reason to change prices, and thus prices will be 
changed less often. Or, to take yet another interaction, if fluctuations in demand 
are  mean-reverting,  then  less  frequent  changes  in  prices  will  also mean  a 
smaller average response of prices to demand. But while they interact, they are 
about two different phenomena. 
This distinction is not made explicitly in the survey. Some of the theories 
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and some are about why there may be lags in the response of nominal prices to 
their determinants. Roughly, theories B 1, B4, B8, and B9 are primarily about 
nominal rigidities, the others primarily  about real rigidities.  Is it because the 
distinction is one which economists may see but firms would have had a hard 
time grasping? I do not think so. Real rigidities correspond to questions such 
as When you sit down to change prices, how do you take into account changes 
in demand and changes in factor prices? Do you react differently to changes 
in demand if they are industrywide or specific to your firm? Nominal rigidities 
correspond instead to questions such as How often do you change prices? Does 
this happen on regular dates, or is it triggered by events, such as large changes 
in factor prices? Do you change most prices at once? Do you try to get the 
price right now, or later when it is still fixed and inflation has taken place? 
I think the survey pays a large cost as a result of not making this distinction. 
At the presentation stage, organizing theories along those two lines would have 
helped at least this reader to map the results to macro implications.  But the 
cost is higher. Not making the distinction leads Blinder to ask what I think are 
incorrectly phrased questions, and thus get what are quite possibly misleading 
answers. A number of theories which are designed to explain why prices may 
respond little to demand shifts are phrased in terms of  explaining a slow re- 
sponse rather than a lack of response. I shall take one example. Question B7 
reads: 
It has been  suggested that many  firms base prices on costs. Hence firms 
with constant variable costs per unit have no reason to change prices when 
production changes. 
How important is this idea in explaining the speed of  price adjustment in 
your company? (emphasis added) 
Take a firm which uses a fixed markup rule and has constant variable costs. 
It may interpret the question as “How important is this idea in explaining why 
you  do not  change  prices  in response  to demand?’  and  answer  “Very im- 
portant.” But it may instead interpret the question literally and conclude that 
flat marginal cost has nothing to do with the speed of adjustment, and thus 
answer “Totally unimportant.” 
This point is more than nitpicking.  Very  surprisingly-at  least given my 
priors-of  those firms which declared to have roughly constant variable cost 
per unit, 73 percent turn out to answer “Totally unimportant” to the question. 
What do they have in mind? That markups are not constant, or that markups 
are constant but this has nothing to do with slow adjustment? This takes me to 
my third set of points. 
On the Picture of Price-Setting Which Emerges 
Together, the  three  top-ranked  theories  point  to  imperfectly  competitive 
markets, in which (a)  firms worry about the reaction of other firms to price 
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plus pricing rules, perhaps as coordination devices (“cost-based pricing with 
lags,” ranked second); and, (c)  partly in contradiction to the rationale for using 
simple price rules as coordination devices, goods have many  attributes other 
than price that are adjusted in response to demand (“delivery lags,” ranked 
third). This is a very interesting picture. But in each case one would like to 
know more. 
Blinder emphasizes that he is looking for a particular kind of “coordination 
failure,” one which can emerge even in markets with large numbers of  firms. 
As he himself acknowledges, however, what firms have in mind when they 
answer “Very important” to that question is in fact unclear. He indicates that a 
number of firms appear to be thinking of  a leader-follower relations. Thus I 
see those answers as confirming the notion that most firms worry very much 
about other firms’ reactions, but as telling us little beyond that. The black box 
of short-run movements in prices in response to demand shifts in imperfectly 
competitive markets remains closed. 
What firms mean by cost-based pricing also remains unclear. Do firms have 
more or less flat marginal cost? The answer to that question is clear. Only 11 
percent of  the firms report upward sloping marginal cost; the others report 
either flat or decreasing marginal cost. Do firms use more or less constant 
markups? Here there are conflicting answers. Of those reporting constant mar- 
ginal cost,  73 percent  dismiss that  as “totally unimportant” in  explaining 
the speed of price adjustment. I discussed earlier how we might interpret the 
answer. One interpretation is that firms do have highly variable markups. But 
this interpretation is contradicted by  the answers to question B6, which de- 
scribes cost-plus pricing, and finds substantial support among firms, being 
ranked second overall. 
Nominal rigidities do not score high. Costs of adjustment of prices come in 
in sixth place. But, as I suggested earlier, this is probably as it should be, even 
if nominal rigidities are important. The theme of the research on nominal rigid- 
ities is that they appear to be relatively unimportant to individual price setters, 
yet they may cumulate to have large macro effects. This may be a case where 
asking firms is indeed not the way  to go. And for the same reasons, namely 
since they see these aspects of price-setting as minor, asking them to compare 
the costs of adjusting quantities to those of adjusting prices may not elicit very 
useful answers. 
Where the survey could have  been more useful here would have  been in 
asking such questions about whether firms tended to adjust prices at regular 
intervals, or in response to specific changes in the environment, whether firms 
adjusted the price to a level which was right at the time of price setting, or took 
into account future inflation and  set the price higher as a result. We  have 
learned that the answers to the first set of questions are of much importance in 
determining how individual price rigidities get amplified or eliminated in the 
aggregate. I have come to the conclusion that the answers to the second have 
important macro implications. If  there is positive inflation, and if  firms cor- 154  Alan S. Blinder 
rectly anticipate that their real price will decline throughout the period during 
which it is set in nominal terms, they will choose a price which is too high 
today, but right on average. Average profit margins will be roughly invariant to 
inflation. If instead firms set prices so that they are right at the time of price- 
setting, then there will be a systematic inverse relation between profit margins 
and  inflation.  Recent work  I have carried out on the evolution of  profits  in 
France suggests to me that  some of  the large increase in profit  margins  in 
France in the 1980s has come from this effect combined with the decrease in 
inflation (Blanchard and Muet 1993).  If I am right, this is an important implica- 
tion of nominal price-setting. This is clearly a case where we would learn much 
from asking firms. 
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